News and Notes - May 2014

It's been about a month folks, but new blog posts are coming. In a few days I'll have a few posts to roll out in my continuing series on the 3rd Division of the 6th Corps (formerly known as "French's Pets"). These posts will focus on the division's actions during the Battle of the Wilderness - timed as you might have guessed to coincide with the 150th anniversary of that battle.

A few other items you might want to read in the meantime:

- Over at the Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania National Military Park's excellent blog Mysteries and Conundrums, Chief Historian John Hennessy previews the upcoming programs and events the park has planned to commemorate the 150th anniversary of the Overland Campaign. The lineup of programs looks excellent. I can't make all of the events, but I'm aiming to do my best to be there for some of the programs on May 10th and May 11th.

- There's been a lot of discussion about the successes and/or failures of the Sesquicentennial of the Civil War. A lot of opinions have been thrown out without much data and analysis to back them up. Well, enter Nick Sacco, who has a neat post up on his Exploring the Past blog that attempts to quantify the results of the Sesquicentennial through some basic visitation statistics at some of the major battlefield parks. The numbers might surprise you.

Enjoy.

The Misfits of Reorganization

"Brandy Station, Va. Officers in front of Winter Quarters at Army of the Potomac Headquarters,"
Feb. 1864. Library of Congress.

To see previous entries in this series, click here. 

On March 23rd, 1864, General Orders No. 115 rocked the winter camps of the Army of the Potomac around Culpeper, Virginia:

By direction of the President of the United States, the number of army corps comprising the Army of the Potomac will be reduced to three, viz, the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Corps. The troops of the other two corps, viz, the First and Third, will be temporarily organized and distributed among the Second, Fifth, and Sixth by the commanding general, who will determine what existing organizations will retain their corps badges and other distinctive marks.

These orders abolished two of the most distinguished organizations in the army. The previous year's campaigns, and principally the Battle of Gettysburg, had essentially wrecked the First and the Third, and had severely depleted the army's other three corps. For George Gordon Meade, this reorganization accomplished several objectives. First, it streamlined the army's command structure and created three full strength corps. Second, the reorganization allowed Meade to put his forces under officers he trusted, and to dispense with weaker links in the army's chain of command. The orders left soldiers like John Newton and George Sykes without a command. Meade's plans also showed a deft political touch. He had sparred with General William French during the winter, blaming his slowness for the failure of the Mine Run campaign. Now French had no place in the army. And French's Third Corps represented the strongest element of support for Meade's bitter enemy Dan Sickles, who had hoped to return to the head of his old corps after recovering from the loss of his leg at Gettysburg.

In the ranks, the changes did not go over well. As The New York Times reported on March 26, "The men find themselves among new associates, surrounded by other traditions, and led by different leaders." Writing after the war, Meade's Chief of Staff Andrew A. Humphreys admitted that "the history and association of these organizations were different, and when they were merged in other organizations their identity was lost and their pride and espirit de corps wounded." Not everyone saw the practical reasons for the changes, and only saw political maneuvering. One soldier of the Third Corps's 17th Maine remembered:

It seemed hard to many of us that the organization that had furnished the country with such men as Heintzelman, Kearney, Howard, Berry, Hooker, Sickles, Richardson, Birney, Whipple, Jameson, Robinson, and a host of others, should lose its identity for the sake of personal feeling.

Yet not all the soldiers affected by the revamped command structure minded. Since it joined the Army of the Potomac following the battle of Gettysburg, the third division of the Third Corps had been treated as outcasts by the corps's original two divisions. The veterans of the corps resented French's ascension to command, and disdained the sparse battle record of the new division he brought with him to the army, labeling it "French's Pets." During the Mine Run Campaign that fall, a portion of the third division acquitted itself well against Lee's veterans at the Battle of Payne's Farm (Locust Grove), but French's overall slowness and indecision upset the timetable for Meade's plans. As the army went into winter quarters around Brandy Station, the third division had yet to win over their comrades.

Meade's plan for reorganization displayed an understanding of the realities of unit cohesion within the Third Corps. He decided to keep all of the First Corps together, consolidating the fighting force's three divisions into two and adding it to the Fifth Corps. He would not keep the Third Corps together however. Its first two divisions - the "old Third Corps" - joined the Second Corps, while the third division would move to John Sedgwick's Sixth Corps. While most of the veterans involved in the reorganization received permission to keep their corps insignia, French's Pets did not. Having failed to gain acceptance in the Third Corps, the third division would seek to forge a new identity in the Sixth.

The soldiers of the third division did not resent the change like many of their comrades with deeper connections to their corps identities. Some may have even welcomed it. A soldier of the 10th Vermont recalled that, while "some complaint followed the breaking up of Third Corps...there was no heart burnings with us." Meanwhile, Colonel J. Warren Keifer of the 110th Ohio, writing about corps ensignias, explained that the "Third Division for a time adhered to the 'diamond', but later, wore both proudly, and finally rejoiced alone under the 'Greek cross.'"

Yet once again, the soldiers of the new third division, Sixth Corps found themselves with the task of convincing hardened veterans that they belonged. "Thus when we cast off the diamond-shaped badge of the 3rd Army Corps," wrote Osceola Lewis of the 138th Pennsylvania:

and adopted the "Blue Cross" of the 6th, we found many veterans among our new comrades, who complained that we should assume the right and privilege. "What have they ever done," or "where did they ever see any service," they would sometimes ask, forgetting that the blood already spilled by the 3rd Division, if not great in quantity, was very precious in quality.

To many in the Army of the Potomac, the "quality" of the Blue Cross division remained to be seen. While their service at Payne's Farm in November of 1863 loomed large in the formation of their own identity, the small action accomplished little, and failed to impress the rest of the army. The division could not shake the reputation it had earned as a result of disastrous events in the Shenandoah Valley that some of its units had taken part in while under the command of Robert H. Milroy at the start of the Gettysburg Campaign.

James B. Ricketts. Library of Congress.

 A shakeup in the third division's command structure coinciding with the Army reorganization. At the end of April, Major General James B. Ricketts took over command. A native New Yorker and a graduate of the West Point Class of 1839, Ricketts had earned distinction commanding a battery of artillery at Bull Run, where he was wounded four times and left for dead on the field. Taken prisoner, Ricketts was exchanged in January of 1862, and returned to the field as a brigadier general, fighting at Cedar Mountain, Throroughfare Gap, South Mountain, and at Antietam, where had two horses shot from under him - the second injuring Ricketts when it fell on him. Ricketts relinquished his command following the battle to recover from his injuries, and the third division would mark his first field command in over a year.

Truman Seymour. Library of Congress.

The new look third division now contained just two brigades. The first, commanded by Brigadier General William H. Morris, featured the 14th New Jersey, 106th and 151st New York, the 87th Pennsylvania, and the 10th Vermont. Rickett's second brigade was commanded by Brigadier General Truman Seymour, another new officer to the division. A West Pointer from the Class of 1846, Seymour had been at Fort Sumter when the war began. He had seen service with the Army of the Potomac, in Charleston Harbor, and had been in charge of the District of Florida, where he suffered defeat at the battle of Olustee in February of 1864. Following the battle Seymour was relieved and returned to the Virginia theater to take command of this brigade, which featured the 6th Maryland, 110th, 122nd and 126th Ohio, and the 67th and 138th Pennsylvania.


As the temperatures rose and the roads continued to harden that spring, Ricketts and his men looked forward to the coming campaign season, and another chance to win acceptance in the Army of the Potomac.

French's Pets - First Blood at Payne's Farm

Part 5 in a series. Click here to see other related posts.
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Just after midnight on November 27, 1863, Army of the Potomac Headquarters issued a circular to corps commanders outlining the orders for the following morning. After a frustrating day of delays crossing the Rapidan River, General George Gordon Meade hoped that he could still steal a march on Robert E. Lee and strike the Army of Northern Virginia's right flank with overwhelming force. Headquarters set the movement of the army for 7 a.m. The Second Corps under Maj. Gen. G.K. Warren would push out on the Orange Turnpike to
ward New Verdierville, while the rest of the army would endeavor to close on the 2nd at that location and protect its flanks. Once assembled, Meade hoped his army could strike a blow.

The army's camps stirred early the next morning. As he began to execute his orders, Third Corps commander Maj. Gen. William French ran into difficulty navigating the unfamiliar network of country paths through the Wilderness. Aware of his proximity to the enemy, French proceeded cautiously. His second division under General Henry Prince led the march, and third division commander Joseph Bradford Carr kept his men close behind, with flanking parties sent out to protect the column's right flank. Prince received authority to call upon his supports if needed. Meanwhile, French sent word to Headquarters that most of his artillery, which had a nightmare of a time crossing the Rapidan on the 26th, had still not arrived, and that horses and men would be in no shape for further exertions when they did. At 9:20 a.m., he sent another communication to headquarters:

The head of my column is near the Plank Road and waiting for General Warren.

Meade already blamed French for many of the delays experienced on the 26th, and now tensions between Headquarters and the Third Corps escalated. In reply to French, an exasperated Chief of Staff Andrew A. Humphreys wrote:

What are you waiting for? No orders have been sent to you to wait for General Warren anywhere upon your route. Robertson's Tavern is the point where he takes precedence and he is there now engaged with the enemy who are in strong force. He is waiting for you. The commanding general directs that you move forward as rapidly as possible to Robertson's Tavern where your corps is wanted.

Close to noon, French reported to headquarters that the enemy had appeared in force along his front on the Raccoon Ford Road. Headquarters ordered French to attack, and to throw his left forward in an attempt to connect with Warren's men. The Battle of Payne's Farm was about to begin.

The ridge ascended by Morris's men in their charge at Payne's Farm.

The meeting engagement took place between Prince's second division and Confederates under command of Edward Johnson at the intersection of the Jacob's Ford Road and the Raccoon Ford Road. When it bogged down into a stalemate in the untamed woods adjacent to these two roads, Prince sent back word to his supports in the third division. First to arrive on the scene was the brigade of Colonel William H. Morris, consisting of the 14th New Jersey, the 5th New York Heavy Artillery, the 151st New York, and the 10th Vermont. These troops were almost entirely green. They moved into the woods on Prince's left flank, and took position at the bottom of a ridge. The brigade advanced, crossing over a small stream and scaling the ridge in its front. Their arrival coincided with a Confederate attempt to turn Prince's flank, and Morris's men drove Confederate skirmishers back while taking casualties.

The noise of battle grew to a crescendo. "It was truly a baptism of fire," according to The History of the 10th Vermont Volunteers, USA, "while it was a deluge of lead and iron that swept over us. The musketry was not in the least of a jerky or intermittent sort, but one continuous roll." On the other side of the engagement, a member of the 3rd North Carolina reported that it was "as warm a contest as this regiment was ever engaged in.... it seemed as if the enemy was throwing minie-balls upon us by the bucket-full."

Accompanying the Third Corps on this afternoon, New York Herald correspondent Thomas E. Cook penned a full account of the action:

At first it was exclusively musketry, and right lively it was. I have heard it surpassed, but not often. It was a continuous, deafening roar, rising louder and fiercer as additional troops became engaged, running along the line from right to left, until finally the whole line was engaged. Then gradually the roar modulated into a distinct rattle as the first volleys were discharged and the men were required to load their pieces. Then came a shout, a long, glad shout of triumph, as the charging foe fell back dismayed before the steady and unflinching fire of our valiant men.

"This was the first severe action these men had participated in," Cook recorded of Morris's men....

They are a portion of the recent accession to the corps, and, with the remainder of the division, have been impatient to show the old veterans of the corps that they were not made of inferior stuff. The opportunity was well improved.

Morris's men crested the rise of ground and found shelter behind a worm fence at the edge of the woods. Colonel J. Warren Keifer's 2nd brigade moved behind Morris's men and lengthened the battle line on his left flank. Keifer's men, the 6th Maryland, 110th and 122nd Ohio, and the 138th Pennsylvania, had seen scarcely more combat than the 1st brigade. Yet the two brigades arrayed behind the fence presented a formidable position, and soon Confederate battle lines appeared to resume the contest. "They came out in splendid battle array, with waving banners..." Sergeant John R. King of the 6th Maryland recalled, "It was a desperate attempt to dislodge us." Osceola Lewis of the 138th recorded his account of what happened next on the left end of Carr's battle line:

J. Warren Keifer

'Get ready men!' commanded Colonel McClennan, and the 'click' of five hundred muskets gave notice that it was done. Then burst forth in thundering tones five hundred iron throats, and 'buck and ball' were hurled against the advancing enemy with telling effect. His lines wavered, hesitated and finally halted, but the storm of battle did not abate. The opposing lines became wrapt in one dense sheet of musketry, and from left to right the terrible crash of arms resounded.

The 138th used its .69 caliber muskets with deadly effect at close range, but suffered in return. Colonel McClellan was carried from the field after a minie ball pierced his foot, while Captain Charles Fisher of Company A and Adjutant J.W. Cress also suffered serious wounds. Morris and Keifer's men withstood multiple Confederate charges, and clung to their position for several hours, until ammunition ran out. Near dark, the troops were relieved by men from David Birney's first division. They retired to the rear and took stock of their losses. In the 110th Ohio, the men mourned the loss of Lieutenant James A. Fox. "He had risen from the ranks, but was a proud-spirited and promising officer," Colonel Keifer would relate, "We buried him at midnight, in full uniform, wrapped in his blanket, behind a near-by garden fence." In all, Keifer lost 172 men, though he proudly noted that none had been captured.

The Battle of Payne's Farm or Locust Grove was inconclusive. The federal lines held against a foe with inferior numbers, but the battle delayed French's Corps for an entire afternoon, buying time for Robert E. Lee to react to the Army of the Potomac's attempt to turn his flank. The lost time doomed Meade's Mine Run Campaign. Yet for French's Pets, the battle marked a first opportunity to prove themselves in battle, and they made the most of their chance. Writing for the Herald, correspondent Cook summed up his thoughts of the green soldiers:  "Althogether, this division did nobly. It was their baptism under fire, and henceforth they must be sharers in the glory and renown of the gallant to which they are attached."

Not all agreed fully with Cook's assessment. The third brigade of Carr's division, under Colonel Benjamin F. Smith, fell into confusion as it passed through a low, swampy thicket in an attempt to extend Keifer's flank. It retired in confusion after Confederates skirmishers fired upon it in this state. By and large, the rest of the Army of the Potomac would take little notice of the performance put in by Carr's two remaining brigades. In the aftermath of the Mine Run Campaign's failure, the spotlight would fall not on his men, but on French himself, and on his slow and deliberate performance. Meade's volunteer aide Theodore Lyman summed up views at Headquarters when he wrote home:

If you ask what were the causes of failure, they lie in a nutshell - Slowness and want of Detail. We have fought for two years and a half, but it takes no wiseacre to see that we have yet much to learn. Were it not for the remarkable intelligence of the men, we could not do even as well as we do...

Meade blamed French for the campaign's failures, and that winter would find no place for French in his reorganized army.

A Note on Sources:
Sources include several regimental histories and personal memoirs available via google books and other online archives. I also utilized the Official Records, Thomas E. Cook's account of the battle that appeared in the New York Herald on December 4th, 1863, and the interpretive signage on the Payne's Farm Battlefield completed by the Civil War Trust.

News and Notes - November 2013

I've let about two weeks pass since my last post, and so I thought a quick update might be in order. I continue to settle into life in Charlottesville, Virginia, and unfortunately I have not had much time to devote to the blog. I recently accepted a position at Monticello, and I've devoted the spare time I've had between unpacking and other tasks to brushing up on my knowledge of Jefferson, Revolutionary America, and the Early Republic. As a result, my Civil War reading and research has taken a back seat. While the posts might not come as frequently as they used to, they will keep coming. My next substantive entry will continue my series on French's Pets.

As the blog moves forward, it will evolve a bit to take into account my new location. Initially, Battlefield Back Stories largely focused on the Battle of Gettysburg - a reflection of the fact that I have spent far more time exploring that field than any other Civil War battleground. After all, you cannot write quality accounts of Civil War battles without comprehending the terrain the contending armies fought over. Over time, I have broadened this focus quite frequently, and with my new-found proximity to Virginia battlefields, I hope to continue that trend.

We approach the 150th anniversaries of the Gettysburg Address and the Mine Run Campaign. One of these commemorations will receive a good deal of attention, and I look forward to observing how the national media remembers Lincoln's words. The other will register little more than a blip on most people's radar. As we move towards 2014, I look forward to taking part in some of the sesquicentennial commemorations here in Virginia, but I wonder how much attention these anniversaries will receive outside the circle of Civil War enthusiasts.

Crossing the Rapidan

 This is part 4 in an on-going series on the third division of the Third Corps - "French's Pets."
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It was Thursday, November 26th, 1863; a day that President Lincoln had proclaimed a national day of "Thanksgiving and Praise." The soldiers of the Army of the Potomac, encamped around Brandy Station, stirred early. "Nothing could be more magnificent than this autumnal morning," recorded Thomas E. Cook, a New York Herald correspondent traveling with the Third Corps. "The last stars were fading from sight," he continued, "the rising light of day chasing them away--as the bugles sounded the advance."

The Army of the Potomac had remained in camps around Brandy Station for more than two weeks, since November 8th. They had crossed the Rappahannock in early November searching for a battle with the Army of Northern Virginia, but Robert E. Lee had pulled his army back behind the Rapidan River into Orange County instead. Pressed into action by Abraham Lincoln and Henry Halleck, George G. Meade had determined to make one final campaign before winter set in, and a headquarters circular issued marching orders for the morning of November 24th. Continuing rains turned the Virginia roads to quagmires though, and the movement was suspended to await an improvement in the weather. Now, on the morning of the 26th, the troops moved out.

Meade's plan called for the Army of the Potomac to push swiftly across the Rapidan at three undefended crossing sites downstream from Lee's right flank, assemble on the Orange Turnpike, and advance into Lee's right rear. One column, headed by the Fifth Corps, would cross at Culpeper Mine Ford, furthest to the east. The Second Corps and Army Headquarters would cross at Germanna Ford and advance to Robertson's Tavern on the Orange Turnpike. Meanwhile, the Third Corps, followed by the Sixth, would cross the river on pontoon bridges at Jacob's Mill, closest to Lee's known position, and endeavor to connect with the Second Corps's right flank in the vicinity of Robertson's tavern. The success of the movement depended on the army's ability to move with celerity. Yet, as so often happened with this army, the plans began to unravel almost immediately.

Muddy roads delayed the Third Corps march to Jacob's Mill. Soldiers marched ankle deep in the muck, and horses struggled to pull the artillery and wagons on the rutted roads. Yet spirits remained high, and they were boosted when General Meade had word of Ulysses S. Grant's triumph at Chattanooga announced to the troops. At around noon the head of the column reached the river. Already tensions were running high between army headquarters and Third Corps commander William French. Annoyed that French's slow progress had delayed timetables for the entire army, at 1 p.m. Meade attempted to put the spurs to the Third Corps. "He directs that you throw your bridge immediately," wrote Chief of Staff Andrew Humphreys to French, "and cross without delay. I am also directed to say that your delay in reaching the river has retarded the operations of General Warren more than two hours, and that this delay calls for explanation."

French bristled at the sniping note from headquarters, and blamed the tardiness on poor roads and his lead division commander, the second division's Henry Prince, but more problems ensued. As French and Humphreys continued to spar over various delays, Captain Charles N. Turnbull of the engineers reported more bad news to headquarters:

The crossing here is bad, except for infantry. There is a very steep hill on opposite side. Artillery can only get up by doubling teams, and it is difficult then. Road will be impassable on this side if it should rain. I have all seven boats and one trestle in the bridge. I have spoken to General French and advised that all artillery should go by Germanna. It is the worst place I have seen for a pontoon bridge. The Third Corps is now crossing.

The steep banks of the river, and the hill on the south side, would not allow artillery to pass. In addition, French found that the pontoon train brought along to bridge the Rapidan was one boat short of the river's width, requiring time to build a derrick to support the final trestle. Finally, at around 3 p.m., the crossing began.

Things did not get easier on the south side of the river. French and Prince had a poor understanding of the terrain and roads south of the Rapidan, a continuation of the dense and tangled underbrush made famous by the battles of Chancellorsville and the Wilderness. A map prepared by the Bureau of Engineers showed a direct road from Jacob's Mill to Robertson's tavern, but Prince could not locate such a road. As correspondent Cook would recount for his readers:  "Through these interminable woods there are numberless tracks, called roads, but in no instance approaching the dignity of that appellation." Marching away from the river, Prince chose the wrong path and had to countermarch back to his starting point. By the time darkness settled over the landscape, the Third Corps had barely gotten three miles beyond the Rapidan, and the Sixth Corps just finished crossing the river that evening. Meade's attempt to catch Lee by surprise with a swift maneuver had not come off as planned, but he believed an opportunity still existed to strike a blow the next day if he could assemble his corps quickly for a strike at Lee's right flank.

That night, Carr's third division camped south of the Rapidan River, second in the corps line behind Prince's men. Like many of their comrades, they were not thrilled at the prospect of work ahead. A member of the 138th Pennsylvania recalled:

The weather, as may be readily judged, was at this time quite wintry, and it was with no great degree of comfort that we trudged toward the Rapidan that November day, with a winter campaign before us, and with the disagreeable recollection of the cold nights we had passed, during the few previous weeks, at Brandy Station.

Yet these soldiers also hoped to prove their dependability to their comrades in the Third Corps. As they bedded down for the night on November 26th, many may have wondered if the next day would bring them their first true taste of significant combat with the Army of the Potomac.

A Hike on the Payne's Farm Interpretive Trail

The misting rains continued today, dampening everything, but not quite enough to deter outdoor activities. This morning I took a drive over to Locust Grove, Virginia to check out the Payne's Farm Battlefield. This battle was the largest engagement during the Mine Run Campaign of November, 1863. It pitted Edward "Allegheny" Johnson's Confederate division against the Third Corps of the Army of the Potomac. Over the years the battle, and the Mine Run Campaign as a whole, has received little attention. And yet, due to its rural, agricultural surroundings, the battlefield has survived untouched by modern intrusions. The Civil War Trust and the Piedmont Environmental Council purchased the land in 2003, and in 2011 the Trust opened a 1.5 mile interpretive trail to allow visitors to explore the site.  The trail begins at the Zoar Baptist Church on State Route 611, 2.4 miles north of Route 20. The church allows visitors wishing to explore the trail to park in its parking lot (special arrangements must be made on Sundays).

A close look at the 1.5 mile interpretive trail loop.

The trail begins on the opposite side of the Raccoon Ford Road from the church and starts off moving northwest, paralleling the Raccoon Ford Road until it reaches an intersection with the Jacob's Ford Road.

On the afternoon of November 27th, Union skirmishers approaching the intersection along Jacob's Ford Road (from the camera's right) opened fire on the tail of Edward Johnson's Confederate division, which was passing along the road pictured from right to left. Brigadier General George H. Steuart commanded the final brigade in Johnson's column. Steuart halted his command around the intersection, formed it into a line of battle in the road, and then advanced into the woods to engage the federals. Johnson quickly surveyed the situation and had the rest of his division countermarch to the developing engagement. He did not know that he faced an entire army corps.

From this stop, the trail turns northward and moves through the woods while paralleling the Jacob's Ford Road. As I made my way along the trail, I found only one other soul making use of it on this rainy morning.

The only creature I shared the battlefield with on this damp day.

The initial engagement between Steuart's brigade and Union General Henry Prince's second division of the Third Corps eventually bogged down into a stalemate in the thick woods. Meanwhile, reinforcements made their way to the field.  On the Union side, General Joseph Carr's third division arrived on the scene and moved into position on Prince's left flank, just as Johnson was attempting to turn it. The trail here turns sharply eastward to follow the advance of Carr's three brigades. For most of Carr's men, this would be their first true taste of battle.

The trail follows a small foot bridge across a stream, and then follows the advance of Carr's men up this steep ridge.

Carr's men advanced through the difficult terrain down into a shallow depression, across a small stream, and then up a steep ridge, pushing back a thick line of Confederate skirmishers. After making it to the top of the rise they took a position along a worm fence at the edge of the woods, overlooking open fields. From this position, they beat back several Confederate assaults.

At the top of the ridge, the trail arrives at the edge of the woods and looks out into this field. During the battle a worm fence ran along the woods' edge, and Carr's men made the most of this strong defensive position.

From this point, the trail turns southeast and makes its way to farm lane of Madison Payne, who owned the farm that gave this battle its name. As the battle progressed, Confederates established their main line of battle in Mr. Payne's lane, and launched several uncoordinated and unsuccessful assaults across his fields toward Carr's men positioned in the woods beyond.

This image looks across the open field towards the woods occupied by the Third Corps from the Confederate position in Payne's Farm lane.

The Payne Farm can be seen here in the distance, and the farm lane runs along the right side of this image.

After dark, the Confederates fell back to Raccoon Ford Road, and eventually the main Confederate position being set up behind Mine Run. Johnson's assault against the Third Corps was technically not successful, but it delayed a significant portion of the Army of the Potomac for an entire afternoon, and gave General Lee much needed time to set up an impressive defensive position behind Mine Run. The strength of Lee's position doomed Meade's campaign to failure.

The 1.5 mile Payne's Farm loop takes about an hour to an hour and a half to complete if you plan on reading all of the interpretive signs (which are well done). Later this week I'll take a more detailed look at this battle as I continue my series on French's Pets. If you can't make it yourself to explore the Payne's Farm battlefield, enjoy this nicely done video tour from the Civil War Trust's Garry Adelman:


4 Minutes at Payne's Farm from Civil War Trust on Vimeo.

A Baptism of Fire at Brandy Station

This is Part 3 of an on-going series taking a closer look at "French's Pets," the third division of the Third Corps (later transferred to the Sixth Corps).
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By November of 1863, Joseph Bradford Carr's third division of the Third Corps had served in the Army of the Potomac for the better part of four months, and yet it had seen no combat. Since recrossing to the south side of the Potomac River after Gettysburg, the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia had grappled with each other in a contest of maneuver, skirmishing and fighting a few larger engagements such as the Battle of Bristoe Station on October 14th. The two foes had avoided a general battle, and the Army of the Potomac had avoided testing its greenest division. By the end of October, Robert E. Lee had withdrawn his army below the Rappahannock, leaving a small force north of the river at Rappahannock Station to defend the crossing there. Lee positioned the remainder of his army between the river and Culpeper, and his men began to build huts for winter quarters.

George Gordon Meade was not content to end active operations for the year. Informed that Lee's army had begun to construct huts, he decided to push his army across the Rappahannock to confront the Army of Northern Virginia, and issued orders for an army-wide advance on the morning of November 7th, 1863. A column comprised of the Fifth and Sixth Corps and led by Major General John Sedgwick would force a crossing at Rappahannock Station. Meanwhile, Major General William H. French would lead a second column, the First, Second, and Third Corps, advancing against Kelly's Ford downstream. Once both forces crossed the river, they would march on Brandy Station and offer battle. For the men of the third division, this movement would provide yet another chance to prove their mettle.

"Fight at Kelly's Ford. Sleeper's battery." Drawn by Alfred Waud, 7 November 1863. Library of Congress.

At about 7 a.m. on the morning of November 7th, the men of the Third Corps broke up their camps around Warrenton Junction and took up the road for Kelly's Ford. David Birney's first division led the march, and unexpectedly found enemy infantry posted behind rifle pits supported by artillery on the opposite bank when they arrived at the ford around noon. As the third division closed up behind Birney's men, Third Corps artillery batteries unlimbered on the north bank of the river and began to bombard the south bank. When Carr's men arrived on the scene, they moved into position on the left of the first division to support the corps artillery. Meanwhile, Birney's men assaulted and carried the south bank of the river. The Confederates who had opposed the Third Corps, men of Robert Rodes' division, drew off toward Brandy Station, and the Third Corps began to cross the river. A pontoon bridge was laid at the ford, and at 5:10 that afternoon French reported to Army Headquarters:

The Third Corps is crossing the bridge and getting into position; the Second is massing near.... The enemy occupy a rifle-pit covering the road to Brandy. I hope to have it before dark.... Should there be an advance of the whole army here, it must for a while be a bushwhacking affair until we seize the plains beyond. I will force the fighting as early to-morrow as the troops can see. The pickets are ordered to push out to-night.

"Capture of the fortifications on the Rappahannock at the Railway Bridge--by the right wing commanded by Genl. Sedgwick." Drawn by Alfred Waud, 7 November 1863. Library of Congress.

Late that afternoon, the Fifth and Sixth Corps stormed Confederate defenses at Rappahannock Station, and drove the rebels to the river's south bank. Meade's initial plans had come off with minimal complications. With one column across at Kelly's Ford and the other ready to cross the next morning, many expected a battle the following day. At Kelly's Ford, Carr's men had crossed the river by about 7:00 that evening and camped near the south bank. The next morning, they would rotate to the front of the Third Corps column. As French pushed his forces toward a junction at Brandy Station, his pets would lead the way.

Carr's men awoke early on November 8th. Colonel Joseph W. Keifer's 2nd brigade would lead the advance. Not knowing how far Rodes's men had fallen back, at 4 a.m. Keifer ordered his two Ohio regiments, the 110th and 122nd, to make a reconnaissance down the road toward Brandy Station. These two regiments found that the rebels had left during the night, and scooped up 38 stragglers as they advanced a mile and a half. Satisfied that the Confederates were in retreat, French ordered Carr's division to begin the march toward Brandy Station. Keifer's brigade led, with the 6th Maryland in front. They marched to within two and a half miles of their goal, when Keifer found a rearguard of cavalry and a battery of artillery drawn up along a rise of ground and astride the Orange & Alexandria Railroad, apparently intent to dispute their continued advance. The Colonel halted his brigade and deployed it for action, the 6th Maryland astride the right side of the railroad, and the 110th Ohio moving into line on the Marylanders' right. On the left side of the railroad Keifer positioned the entirely green 138th Pennsylvania, supported by the 122nd Ohio. Keifer ordered the 110th and the 138th to each push forward a company of skirmishers. In the 138th, Captain Charles Fisher led Company A forward, while 1st Lieutenant James A. Fox led Company B of the 110th out into the fields to confront the Confederate rearguard.

General Carr came forward and ordered Keifer to advance two regiments to carry the hill, and the 110th and the 138th began to advance behind their skirmishers. The 110th had seen action before at Second Winchester, but this marked the 138th's first venture under fire. The two regiments moved forward across a plain commanded by the rebel battery. As the 138th Pennsylvania crested a small knoll, the Confederate artillery opened with shrapnel, shell, and solid shot. The 138th's regimental historian Osceola Lewis remembered that "Shells whizzed over our heads and through our ranks, tore up the turf before and behind us; fragments of shrapnel hummed about our ears; and solid shot bounded over and around us." Near the center of the regimental line in Company H, a deadly missile burst just as it struck Captain Lazarus C. Andress, badly mangling his hip and thigh, and splintering his sword. Fragments from the shell also shattered the left arm of Sergeant Abraham Rapp, while a piece of Andress's sword severely bruised Rapp's thigh and lodged in his pocketbook. The shell also minorly wounded two other members of Company H. Andress, a blacksmith from Doylestown, Pennsylvania, had organized Company H and served as its captain since the beginning of its service. He would hang on to his life for four days before succumbing to his wounds on November 12th, the first death in combat for the 138th. Rapp would lose his left arm. Yet the regiment did not falter. Unable to capture the rebel artillery, the 110th Ohio and 138th Pennsylvania succeeded in driving the rebels off. The two regiments continued their pursuit of the enemy through Brandy Station. Occassionally the rebel rearguard would pause to throw a few shells toward Keifer's men in an attempt to keep them at a respectful distance.

At Brandy Station, the pursuit was called off. Lee's army was in retreat across the Rapidan River. By the standards set by the Army of the Potomac, the affair at Brandy Station was a minor skirmish. The 138th suffered a total of seven casualties, and the 110th Ohio lost none. For the men of Joseph W. Keifer's second brigade, however, it had marked a baptism of fire as members of the Army of the Potomac. Keifer and his men hoped that this minor but successful affair would prove their worth to those officers who still distrusted the third division of the Third Corps. Ever mindful of his men's poor reputation as he wrote up his report of the affair, Keifer recorded:

 Officers and men were prompt in obeying orders. The manner in which they performed the services required of them fully warrants me saying that when more important and dangerous duties are assigned to them, they will willingly and cheerfully discharge them.

Of Captain Andress, Keifer wrote that "his loss is deeply regretted by all who knew him." For the men of the 138th Pennsylvania, and their comrades in Carr's division, this was just the beginning of their war.

------------------------
Sources
War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series 1, Volume 29, parts 1 and 2.

Andrew Atkinson Humphreys, From Gettysburg to the Rapidan: The Army of the Potomac, July 1863 to April 1864, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1883.

Edwin Mortimer Haynes, A History of the Tenth Regiment, Vermont Volunteers...," Published by the Tenth Vermont Regimental Association, 1870.

Osceola Lewis, History of the One Hundred and Thirty-Eighth Regiment, Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry, Norristown: Wills, Iredell & Jenkins, 1866.

Samuel P. Bates, History of Pennsylvania Volunteers: 1861-5, Harrisburg: State Printer, 1868-1871.

"Fight it out with Facts Instead of Bullets"

The 111th New York monument at the Brian Barn. Photo taken by author on June 30, 2013.

Today I take a bit of a break from my series on French's Pets and return to Gettysburg. I've always had a fascination with the period of monumentation on the Gettysburg battlefield, and some of the placement controversies that arose during that time. The most famous of these postwar battles centered on the placement of the 72nd Pennsylvania monument at the stone wall of the angle, a case that went all the way to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. While this controversy has received a great deal of attention over the years, others of similar nature cropped up in the 1880s and 1890s. Flipping through the Bachelder Papers last week, I discovered a controversy that I had never run across before.
 

On May 27th, 1890, members of the New Jersey Monument Commission met upon the Gettysburg Battlefield to inspect the state's monuments and their surroundings. When the group approached the monument to the 12th New Jersey, located along the stone wall west of Hancock Avenue and south of the Abraham Brian farm, they discovered that something was amiss. There at the wall, between the 12th New Jersey monument and its right flank marker, excavations had begun on the foundation for a new monument. The Commission's reaction, and the controversy that followed, reveals the importance that Gettysburg veterans placed on the monuments on the field. In their minds, the memorials not only honored sacrifice, but also served as a permanent record of their deeds, written in stone for all time. These monuments would become the irrefutable evidence that visitors to the field would use to make sense of events. With such a mindset, even short distances became flash points between veteran organizations when it came to monument placement.

This particular controversy surrounded a new monument commissioned by the veterans of the 111th New York Infantry. In the battle, both the 111th and the 12th New Jersey served in Brig. Gen. Alexander Hays' third division of the Second Corps, though in separate brigades. The disagreement centered on each regiment's respective role during the repulse of Pickett's Charge on the afternoon of July 3rd. The 2nd brigade (including the 12th NJ) held a position along the stonewall between the angle and Abraham Brian's barn. The 3rd brigade (including the 111th), began the day in support of the 2nd, resting in an orchard just to to the east of the Brian house. According to guidelines established in 1887 by the Gettysburg Battlefield Memorial Association, regiments were required to place their monuments on their "line of battle" where they entered the fight. The 12th contended that the New Yorkers had spent the entirety of Pickett's Charge in a line to their rear, and had only rushed forward at the end of the conflict. Meanwhile the 111th contended that they had moved forward to the stone wall by the Brian barn at the beginning of the rebel cannonade, and had held that position during the entirety of the charge. The difference in opinion could be measured in a few yards - to place a monument on the east side of Hancock Avenue, or on the west - but those yards meant a great deal to both sides.

A modern satellite view of northern Cemetery Ridge taken from google maps.

The opening salvo in the affair came on May 28th, 1890, the day after the New Jersey Monument Commission first beheld the proposed location of the 111th's monument. On that day, the commission sought out Charles H. Buehler, Vice President of the Gettysburg Battlefield Memorial Association, as well as secretary Calvin Hamilton, to complain about the 111th's monument. Among the commissioners was Edward L. Stratton, who had commanded Company F of the 12th New Jersey during the battle. That evening, Stratton and his fellow commissioners sat down at the Eagle Hotel on Chambersburg Street and wrote out a formal protest to Buehler. Work on the new monument came to a temporary halt.

Within a few days, the New Jersey commissioners began to rally support among the veterans of the 12th New Jersey to fight the monument location, and the letter writing began. On May 31, Capt. William E. Potter, the President of the 12th's Reunion Society, took pen in hand to write to the Adjutant General of New Jersey:

No one desires to disparage the services of the 111th New York. But it is capable of the clearest proof that whatever firing they did upon that eventful day was done in rear of, and over the heads of the line of the 12th New Jersey Volunteers which completely filled up the space between the barn spoken of, and the right flank of the 1st Delaware Vols.

Another veteran, First Sergeant Joseph Burroughs of Company A, 12th New Jersey, took up the cause with a pair of letters to GBMA officials on June 4th -  one to John Bachelder, and the other to Edward McPherson. Pointing to the previously erected monuments of the the 3rd brigade, (the 39th, 125th and 126th New York), he noted that "the other regiments of that brigade have placed their monuments on their (the second) line, and we cannot see the justice of the action of the 111th." Henry F. Chew, another veteran who commanded a company of the 12th during the battle, also wrote on the 4th. " The members of our regiment are very indignant over the matter," he explained to Bachelder, "and have directed me to proceed to Gettysburg as soon as possible and see what can be done." He would arrive a week later.

Letters continued to pour in, and on June 10th, the Adjutant General of New Jersey, William Stryker, joined the fray at the direction of Governor Leon Abbett, pressing the GBMA to deal with the situation. The swift involvement of the government reflects the political power of veteran organizations in the late 19th century. The outpouring of indignation caused a quick reaction within the GBMA. On the 11th, Buehler wrote to Bachelder, and seemingly laid the blame, and the task of finding a solution at the historian's feet:

I am surprised that the Directors of the Memorial Association, with the experience of the 72d Pa. in their hands, should allow the 111th New York to usurp the position of the 12th New Jersey; and that in direct contradiction to the rule of the association more often alluded to than any other. I hope to hear that this flagrant breach of our rules has been stopped.

For his part, Bachelder also came down on the side of the side of the 12th. The 111th was in a reserve brigade, he wrote to Buehler, "the position of this command should be marked on the East side of Hancock Ave. on a line with the 39th, 125th, and 126th N.Y. of the same brigade."

With the outrage of New Jersey veterans, the pressure of the New Jersey government, and the endorsement of John Bachelder and Charles Buehler, the matter perhaps seemed settled. But in Auburn, New York, Clinton D. MacDougall--commander of the 111th at Gettysburg--was organizing his response.On June 25th, Captain Aaron P. Seeley of the 111th wrote to MacDougall to offer his assistance:

Our percentage of loss at Gettysburg was only exceeded by two other Union Regiments, and the survivors will never forget, where they stood and where their comrades fell, and should it become necessary for the old fellows to go down, and fight it out with facts instead of bullets. Give us the long roll and we are at your heels as of yore.

The battle had been joined. In my next post I will look at the 111th's response and the ultimate resolution. To be continued.

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Source Note: The correspondence cited in this post comes from The Bachelder Papers: Gettysburg in Their Own Words, Volumen III, transcribed, edited and annotated by David L. and Audrey J. Ladd, and published by Morningside Press in 1995.

French's Pets: Meeting the Officers of the 3rd Division, 3rd Corps

See Part 1 of the Series.

In the aftermath of the Battle of Gettysburg, twelve inexperienced regiments joined the Third Corps of the Army of the Potomac. Though the veterans of the corps disdained the soldiers that made up its new Third Division, many of these new additions welcomed the change of pace after ten months of guarding railroads and canal locks. Let's meet some of the officers of this new division.

Major General William H. French and staff, September 1863. Library of Congress.

Maj. Gen. William H. French served as the Third Division's first commander, though not for long. When French's men joined the Third Corps, he became its ranking officer, and with Dan Sickles absent due to his Gettysburg wound, French assumed command of the corps. French was no stranger to the Army of the Potomac, he had served in the Second Corps until late June of 1863, as a brigade and division commander, and he had demonstrated an ability to command soldiers in the field. Yet the officers of the Third Corps viewed their new commander as an outsider. Colonel Regis de Trobriand, a brigade commander in the corps, noted that the way in which French "exercised his new authority was not calculated to render him popular." Some veterans thought he showed favoritism to the new Third Division.

Joseph Bradford Carr. Library of Congress.

With French commanding the corps, the Third Division fell at first to the command of Brigadier General Washington Lafayette Elliott. Elliot was a professional soldier who had seen service in the west as well as the east. But on October 3rd, 1863 he was ordered to report to the Army of the Cumberland. His replacement was a veteran of the Third Corps, Joseph Bradford Carr. Carr was born in Albany in 1828; his parents had both emigrated from Ireland just a few years earlier. Prior to the war he worked as a tobacco merchant and a dance master, but had also served as an officer in a local militia unit. In the spring of 1861, Carr received command of the 2nd New York. While serving on the Peninsula he swiftly rose to brigade command, and continued to head a brigade in the Third Corps until October of 1863, when he replaced Elliot. He was a veteran of many of the Army of the Potomac's battles, and had shown courage and skill as a combat leader.

The division's three brigades were commanded by Brig. Gen. William H. Morris, Colonel Joseph Warren Keifer, and Colonel Benjamin F. Smith. Though they commanded soldiers who had seen little or no combat, all three officers had been tested in battle to various degrees, and two of the three, Morris and Smith, were West Point graduates. Morris graduated in 1851. During the Peninsula campaign he served on the staff of General J.J. Peck. In the fall of 1862, he took command of the 135th New York, soon rechristened the 6th New York Heavy Artillery. For a time Morris and his men served in the defenses of Baltimore at Fort McHenry. They eventually moved to Harper's Ferry where, as a newly minted Brigadier General, Morris oversaw the garrison on Maryland Heights until the Gettysburg Campaign wrought vast changes in the structure of the defenses in Maryland. Once attached to the Army of the Potomac, Morris's brigade consisted of his old command, the 6th New York Heavy Artillery, as well as the 14th New Jersey, 151st New York, and the 10th Vermont. To this point in the war, none of these soldiers had seen combat, though they had all been in the service since the fall of 1862. Instead they had guarded railroad lines and other posts along the upper Potomac, or had marked time in the defense of Baltimore.

Brigadier General William H. Morris. Library of Congress.

Joseph Warren Keifer commanded the 2nd Brigade. Keifer was an Ohioan, and at the start of the Civil War he joined up with the 3rd Ohio and received a commission as its Major. He was further promoted to the position of Lieutenant Colonel of the regiment, and saw action at Rich Mountain and Cheat Mountain in West Virginia. In September of 1862 he left the 3rd to become Colonel of the newly formed 110th Ohio. The 110th made up part of Milroy's command at Winchester in June of 1863, and saw combat against Ewell there. When the 110th joined the Army of the Potomac, Keifer ascended to brigade command. Joining the 110th Ohio in this brigade was the 122nd Ohio, the 6th Maryland, and the 138th Pennsylvania. The two former regiments had also served with Milroy at Winchester, but the 138th had never seen combat, having spent its ten months of service guarding vital locations along the B&O Railroad outside of Baltimore.

Joseph Warren Keifer. Library of Congress.

Colonel Benjamin F. Smith was the third and final brigade commander in the division. A graduate of the class of 1853 at West Point, Smith was a captain in the 6th U.S. Infantry when war came. In August of 1861 he received a commission as the Colonel of the 1st Ohio Infantry, which had just organized for three years of service. As part of Don Carlos Buell's Army of the Cumberland the next spring, Smith led his men into battle on the second day of Shiloh. He received a brevet to the regular army rank of major for gallant and meritorious service at the battle. Later that spring, Smith returned to the 6th Infantry, where he saw service in the Peninsula Campaign and at Second Manassas before taking command of a new regiment that fall, the 126th Ohio. The 126th was assigned to Schenck's 8th Army Corps, and in June of 1863 was stationed at Martinsburg. The brigade that Smith took control of that July consisted of two units from Milroy's battered division, the 67th and 87th Pennsylvania, and two from Brig. Gen. Benjamin F. Kelley's old 1st division, 8th Corps - the 106th New York and Smith's own 126th Ohio. The 67th and 87th PA were the longest serving regiments of this new division for the Army of the Potomac, the only soldiers that had signed up in 1861. All of Smith's regiments had been in combat that June at Winchester or at Martinsburg.

Colonel Benjamin F. Smith. Library of Congress.

Thus organized, the division featured twelve regiments from six different states, all with little or no combat experience. For the men in this division, their first month of service with the Army of the Potomac featured hard marching and little fighting. The division first came under long-range artillery fire at the Battle of Wapping Heights on July 23rd, as the Third Corps tried to smash through Manassas Gap and cut into Lee's retreat route in the Shenandoah Valley. That August, the army came to rest on the north side of the Rappahannock River. For the next five weeks the men rested and recovered as best they could in the sweltering heat. The division received new uniforms and equipment, and on September 7th the Third Corps held a grand review for General Meade. It was this review that helped cement the Third Division's new nickname within the Corps. Chaplain E.M. Haynes of the 10th Vermont recalled the scene:

In their new uniforms and shining muskets, with full ranks and splendid drill, it was not strange that General French would have felt proud of us, or that some of the older soldiers, who had been put to the harder work, should have called us "French's pets."

French may have felt a great pride in the quality of his new fighting force, but had yet to lead it into action. For the veterans of the Army of the Potomac, soldiers earned their reputation on the field, not by the cleanliness of their uniforms. Theodore Lyman, a volunteer aide to General Meade who was also a new addition to the army that summer, captured the haughty pride of the two veteran divisions in the Third Corps as he described the September 7 review:

It was somewhat of a sad sight to look at these veterans, with their travel-stained uniforms and their battered canteens; many of the regiments had no more than 200 men, and their flags were so tattered that you could barely read such names as Fair Oaks, and Williamsburg, where so many of the missing 800 now lie. The men looked spare and brown and in good health; and also as if they would then and there fight French Zouaves or anybody else you chose to bring on.

Like these battle-worn warriors, it seems that the high command of the Army of the Potomac harbored doubts about the qualities of the men in the corps's Third Division. During the Bristoe Campaign that unfolded in September and October, the Third Division found itself relegated to a reserve role guarding the corps wagon train. This campaign came to an end in late October, and the Army of the Potomac returned to a position north of the Rappahannock. As the calendar flipped to November, French's Pets would finally get their chance to prove themselves in battle.

To be continued...

French's Pets

A lot of bloggers have written of late on the state of the Civil War Sesquicentennial. They have wondered aloud whether Gettysburg’s anniversary marked the end of the attention the Sesquicentennial has received from mass audiences, and they have discussed the importance—and the difficulty—of keeping the momentum of the Sesquicentennial going for the next two years.

Somehow, romantic notions of the war up through Gettysburg have survived over the years. There was nothing romantic about places like Shiloh, Antietam, and Chancellorsville, but these depictions remain popular. The story becomes different after Gettysburg though. Try writing a glorified depiction of the Battle of the Wilderness, of the fight at the Mule Shoe, or of Cold Harbor. Complex issues also demand attention when you commemorate the final years of the war – emancipation, massacres of black soldiers, one of the most racially charged elections in our nation’s history, and the fights over Reconstruction that began as early as 1863. And then of course, there is the human toll, and the difficult question: was it worth it?

All of these stories make commemorating the war in 1864 and 1865 complex. But it is a challenge that public historians must accept. Whether or not one believes that Gettysburg and Vicksburg marked a crucial turning point in the war, we must recognize that those who experienced the war did not feel like the beginning of the end was at hand in July of 1863.

In a continuing series of posts, I will take a look at a division of soldiers that joined the Army of the Potomac just days after the fighting concluded at Gettysburg. For these soldiers, the Gettysburg Campaign was not a turning point, it was a start.

A view of Maryland Heights opposite Harper's Ferry. Photographed by James Gibson in 1865. Library of Congress

Late in the afternoon of June 15th, 1863, roughly 1,200 dejected and exhausted soldiers stumbled into Harper's Ferry after a forced march of thirty miles. Major General Robert H. Milroy road at the head of the column. The day before, Milroy had charge of a command of about 9,000 troops at Winchester, Virginia. That afternoon, Confederate forces under Lieutenant General Richard Ewell had assaulted Milroy in his fortifications, and had carried his outer works, rendering the town indefensible. Milroy ordered a retreat during the dead of night, but Ewell set an ambush for the retreating column in the darkness, completely scattering the command. The Confederates captured Milroy's artillery, wagons, and over 3,400 of his men. The rest scattered in multiple directions.

Photographic portrait of Robert H. Milroy taken
at Matthew Brady's studio in Washington.
Library of Congress.

The disaster at Winchester sent shock waves of fear throughout Maryland and Pennsylvania. It marked the first bit of hard intelligence that indicated the Army of Northern Virginia planned to cross the Potomac once again. The engagement also set in motion a chain reaction of events that would eventually see the creation of a new fighting force for the Army of the Potomac.

Strangely enough, Milroy should not have been at Winchester in the first place. He commanded the 2^nd Division, 8^th Army Corps in the Middle Department. This corps was led by Major General Robert C. Schenck, with headquarters at Baltimore. Schenck’s task was to defend the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad in Maryland, Virginia, and West Virginia. In addition to Milroy’s men, Schenck had troops strung out at important points along the railroad. The 8^th Corps’ first division, under the command of Brig. Gen. Benjamin F. Kelley, mustered six brigades spread out to protect the lower Shenandoah Valley and the upper Potomac River crossings. Kelley maintained his headquarters and a strong garrison at Harper’s Ferry, while another 1,300 troops held Martinsburg, 20 miles to the northwest.

Throughout the spring, Major General Henry Halleck, General –in-Chief of Union forces, warned Schenck about Milroy’s exposed position in the Valley. Winchester was an outpost and not at all vital to defense of the railroad, and Schenck was not to attempt to defend it if attacked. Again and again Halleck told Schenck to pull the majority of Milroy’s forces out of Winchester. Again and again, Schenck ignored Halleck. Finally, on June 14^th, Halleck threatened to relieve Schenck if his orders were not followed, but it was too late. By the time Schenck wired Milroy to order a retreat, Confederate forces had cut the telegraph lines. Milroy’s last instructions were to hold the town until further notice. As word of Milroy’s disaster at Winchester spread on June 15^th, Halleck angrily wired General Schenck:

Major-General SCHENCK, Baltimore, Md.:

Do not give General Milroy any command at Harper’s Ferry. We have had enough of that sort of Military genius. If you have not already done so, send all of your small posts and available troops there. That place must be held.

H.W. Halleck,
General-in-Chief

With this message a mobilization of military forces began at Harper’s Ferry. In addition to the troops already present and the remnants of Milroy’s command straggling in, garrison troops from multiple posts in Maryland set out for Harper’s Ferry. They included the 14^th New Jersey, the 151^st New York, the 10^th Vermont, and the 138^th Pennsylvania. Most of these regiments had existed as essentially independent commands up to that point in the war. They were not completely raw soldiers; most had been in the service for about ten months. Yet none had witnessed combat. At Relay House, some nine miles outside of Baltimore, the 138^th Pennsylvania received orders to move out at around 10 p.m. on June 16^th. “We were left under the impression that we were only going on a scout,” one soldier wrote home. They soon found otherwise.

The forces gathering at Harper’s Ferry found themselves initially under the command of Brigadier General Daniel Tyler – an old school army officer and railroad engineer from the West Point Class of 1819. Tyler had recently taken over command of the troops at Martinsburg after serving in the west. He assumed control of all the forces at Harper’s Ferry after the disaster at Winchester, despite Robert Milroy outranking him. By June 19^th, Tyler had concentrated roughly 10,000 men and thirty pieces of artillery. He disposed most of his forces on Maryland Heights opposite Harper’s Ferry, where he began to improve the fortifications as much as possible.  On June 26, Tyler was superseded by Major General William H. French, an officer who had been serving as a division commander in the 2^nd Corps of the Army of the Potomac.

 

William H. French and his staff, taken at Culpeper, Virginia in September of 1863. Library of Congress.

French was a member of the West Point Class of 1837. He served in the Seminole Wars and in the Cherokee Removal. During the Mexican War, he served on the staff of General Franklin Pierce and received three brevets for his actions at Cerro Gordo, Contreras, and Churubusco. In the fall of 1861, French was commissioned a Brigadier General. On the Peninsula, he showed leadership as a 2^nd Corps brigade commander at Fair Oaks and during the Seven Days.  He ascended to division command, and led his division against the Bloody Lane at Antietam, against Mayre’s Heights at Fredericksburg, and at Chancellorsville. French arrived at Harper’s Ferry at a time when the forces stationed there had become part of a power struggle between Halleck and Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, commanding the Army of the Potomac. Hooker wanted this force to evacuate Maryland Heights, while Halleck wanted the post held. In the end, Hooker would offer his resignation over this and other mounting disagreements, and it was accepted.

On June 28^th, the same day that Hooker’s replacement Maj. Gen. George G. Meade took command, he ordered Maryland Heights evacuated. Meade instructed French to designate a portion of his force to oversee the removal of as much government property as possible to Washington, and to march with the rest for Frederick, Maryland. French left roughly 4,000 men on the Heights under the command of Brig. Gen. Washington Lafayette Elliott, and set out on the evening of June 29^th.

While the Army of the Potomac engaged at Gettysburg, French’s forces operated on its southern flank.  He sent a small expedition out on the evening of July 3^rd under Major Shadrack Foley of the 14^th Pennsylvania Cavalry to destroy the Confederate pontoon bridge at Falling Waters. He also sent forces to occupy Crampton’s Gap. On July 5^th, he sent an expedition back to Harper’s Ferry. With the Confederate army in full retreat, Meade ordered French on July 6^th to reoccupy Maryland Heights. On the same day, the forces under General Elliott rejoined French. With the Army of the Potomac’s numbers depleted after Gettysburg, most these troops were assigned to the battered 3^rd Corps, and French assumed command of the corps on July 9^th. French’s command became the third division in the corps, commanded for the time being by General Elliott.

For the men in this new division, these were exciting times. All of the regiments had seen little or no combat in their experience as soldiers so far, they had only known the tedious nature of garrison duty. One soldier in the 138^th Pennsylvania wrote home and explained: “We were playing soldier for 10 long months, and now we are experiencing reality.” Meanwhile, Chaplain E.M. Haynes of the 10^th Vermont recalled: 

Prior to this, our regiment and the regiments with us had acted nearly as an independent command, and had thought ourselves capable of creating quite a ripple on the great tide of events which as yet we had not seen…. Now we were swallowed up in a vast army, and were only as a drop in the mighty wave that was to surge and roll on, until it swept Rebellion from the American Continent, and rocked the Union until it rested in peace.

The excitement experienced by many of these soldiers was not reciprocated by veterans of the Army of the Potomac. Brig. Gen. Joseph J. Bartlett, a brigade commander in the 6^th Corps, wrote that the new troops “amount to nothing as far as fighting is concerned.” The first two divisions of the Third Corps reserved a special antipathy for the new soldiers and their new corps commander, General French. The soldiers eventually took to labeling the Third Division “French’s Pets.” Colonel Regis DeTrobriand recalled how he felt seeing these new soldiers just days after fighting in the Wheatfield at Gettysburg:

While we were fighting in Virginia, they had guarded the railroads, and garrisoned Harper’s Ferry, Winchester, and Martinsburg, where they had made but a poor show when Ewell had presented himself. Amongst us they took the place of those we had left on the field of battle of Chancellorsville and Gettysburg; but they did not replace those. What the Third Corps gained in numbers it lost in homogeneity. On this account, the new-comers were never fully naturalized in the corps. The veterans of Sickles, refractory to the union, maintained their autonomy by the designation universally adopted amongst them: “The Third Corps, as we understand it.”

French’s Pets had joined the Army of the Potomac, but they had much to do to earn acceptance within it.

To be continued...

_____________________  

Sources for this post include:

War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 27, Parts 1&3.

Available Through Google Books:
History of the 10th Vermont, written by Chaplain E.M. Haynes, 1870
History of the 87th Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, George R. Prowell, 1903
Four Years in the Army of the Potomac, Volume 3 by Regis DeTrobriand,1888

Newspapers
"From the 138th Regiment," Star and Banner, July 2, 1863 

Other Sources
The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command by Edwin B. Coddington, 1968
Retreat from Gettysburg: Lee, Logistics & the Pennsylvania Campaign by Kent Masterson Brown, 2005